Period ended 30 June 2026; filed 7 August · Primary: financial statements pp.3–6; restaurant/share notes p.9; MD&A comparable sales, franchise economics and liquidity. June common shares are dated, not a live October count.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/63908/000006390826000073/mcd-20260630.htmQuality-franchise watchlist · valuation discipline
The investment decision
At $242.67, the independent base illustrates a 9.3% five-year annual total return with dividends held as cash. The conditional 20% hurdle is $152.47; the central equity cash-flow DCF is $183.61. Rising reported margins must be tested against the cash cost of NEXT.
Edition update. Substantive research refresh using Q2/H1 filings, September Investor Day primary slides, four supplied analyst notes and the 19 October close. Rebuilds the prior EPS-growth scenario into an explicit cash-funded buyback/share model with correctly timed dividends. Earlier editions preserved.
01. The burger business supports a rent-and-royalty business
McDonald’s earns directly from its own restaurants and indirectly from a much larger franchise system. Conventional franchisees pay rent and royalties linked to sales, often with a minimum rent, while developmental licensees and affiliates generally pay royalties and initial fees. The latter usually fund their own property and restaurant capital. Treating every franchised restaurant as a company-owned property would overstate the real-estate exposure. Agreements typically last 20 years. [S1] [S2]
At June there were 46,028 system restaurants, including 44,016 franchised locations: 95.6% of the network. Only 2,012 were company operated. The corporate accounts therefore recognise only part of the system’s sales. A franchisee selling another meal pays food and labour costs first; McDonald’s receives its contractual share. This produces a high corporate margin, but it does not make franchisee economics irrelevant. Weak traffic, unaffordable remodels or poor restaurant cash returns eventually constrain rent collection, new openings and cooperation. [S1]
Scale supports purchasing terms, advertising reach, convenient sites, digital ordering and a familiar product. These advantages can help deliver affordable meals consistently. They do not eliminate competition from other quick-service formats, convenience stores or home consumption, nor do loyalty-member sales prove incremental demand. Property control and a deep operator network are durable assets; successful reinvestment is the mechanism that keeps them productive. [S1] [S2]
Our view is a quality-franchise watchlist, with valuation discipline. A five-year base returns 9.3% annually with cash dividends held, while a 20% hurdle needs roughly $152 under the same assumptions. The present-value cash cross-check is about $184. A strong brand and a long dividend record do not by themselves establish a bargain at $242.67.
02. The missing ingredient is sustained guest growth
Q2 global comparable sales rose 1.3%; the US increased 0.8%, International Operated Markets 1.5%, and International Developmental Licensed Markets 1.9%. US results reflected a higher average check, including mix, partly offset by negative comparable guest counts. That distinction matters: a higher ticket can protect sales temporarily while visit frequency deteriorates. Next-quarter evidence should separate traffic from pricing and mix rather than celebrate the total alone. [S1]
Value offers can recover visits, but discounts, staffing, ingredients and kitchen complexity determine whether those visits improve restaurant cash. Chicken and beverage expansion may add occasions and market share; preparation complexity can also slow service. Wage, food, occupancy and delivery costs largely hit franchisees before they appear in corporate margins. The supplied October sector note flags mixed commodity pressures, but its basket is not McDonald’s actual purchasing cost and its channel observations are not company-reported traffic. [S1] [S8]
Management’s NEXT strategy seeks 1.5 percentage points of share gains in each of chicken and beverages by 2030, alongside better hospitality and restaurant productivity. It estimates about 250 basis points of gross restaurant efficiencies, equivalent to roughly $100,000 annual gross cash benefit for an average US restaurant once deployed. A portion is to be reinvested; management expects the majority to benefit the restaurant bottom line over time. These are conditional targets, not realised savings or a guaranteed net profit increase. [S3] [S4]
03. NEXT requires cash before the productivity proof
| Management target / plan | Definition and timing |
|---|---|
| ~$5bn corporate partnering | 2027–30; rent relief plus capital support |
| ~$8.5bn partnering through 2036 | Includes the first $5bn; not an additional $8.5bn |
| ~$3bn annual baseline capex | 2027–30, plus $1.5–2bn cumulative NEXT capital support |
| ~4-year franchisee payback / ~5–6-year corporate payback | Management estimates after partnering; contingent on deployment and results |
| Nearly 4.5% new unit growth in 2027 | Moderating to 3–3.5% in 2028–30; unit count is not sales growth |
| Non-comparable-sales contribution | ~2.5% in 2027, moderating to ~2% by 2030 |
| ~98% franchised mix by 2028 | A change in ownership and accounting mix, not equivalent organic growth |
These targets are verified against the company’s presentation, including image-based slides. The implied 2027–30 rent-support component is roughly $3–3.5bn if the rest of the $5bn is the stated $1.5–2bn capital support. The precise annual mix is flexible. New locations in lower-volume markets can increase restaurant counts faster than system sales, which explains why the unit and sales contributions differ. [S3] [S4]
The cash-versus-earnings timing is central. Supplied analysts expect cash rent support to precede its full recognition in earnings over an approximately ten-year period. Our independent model uses a transparent illustrative schedule: $250m cash in 2027, $1bn annually in 2028–30, and $400m in 2031. At a full-year ten-year straight-line convention, the earnings charges are $25m, $125m, $225m, $325m and $365m. This is a house accounting approximation informed by the supplied notes, not confirmed issuer accounting guidance. [S10] [S11]
The model’s revenue and operating margin already include those annual earnings charges. To reach cash, it adds the noncash amortisation back once and subtracts the actual cash relief once. NEXT capital support appears in capex once. Adding the entire $5bn again below free cash flow would double count the commitment. In 2031 support continues in the model; it does not disappear merely because the first four-year target ends.
04. A shrinking revenue line can accompany better economics
When a company restaurant is sold to a franchisee, its full food sales leave corporate revenue. Rent and royalty receipts replace them, and most of its food and labour expense also leave the corporate income statement. Corporate revenue can therefore decline while the operating-margin percentage rises. The percentage has a smaller denominator; investors still need to inspect operating-profit dollars, sale proceeds, remaining property costs and cash reinvestment. [S1] [S4]
That is why our base corporate revenue falls from $27.5bn in FY27 to $26.8bn in FY28 while operating profit rises from $13.34bn to $13.53bn. Those are independent forecasts, not management’s revenue guidance. The model credits no disposal proceeds from refranchising, which is conservative but avoids inventing the sale price and timing. It also does not assume a dollar of higher margin is a dollar of incremental sales.
Management targets adjusted operating margins in the low-to-mid 50% range by 2030, G&A at 1.9% of system sales, and free-cash-flow conversion in the mid-to-high 80% range. Our base reaches a 53.5% model operating margin in 2030, but only 82.2% cash conversion because the cash support schedule is demanding; conversion reaches 89.3% in 2031. This visible shortfall is deliberate rather than quietly assuming every company target is met. The primary slide’s FY25 baseline is 46.1% GAAP and 46.9% adjusted operating margin. Supplied notes referring to 47.5% are not used as the filed baseline. [S3] [S4] [S9]
05. Reported profit converts to cash—but the claims compete
| USD bn, except EPS | FY2024 actual | FY2025 actual | H1 2026 actual | TTM to June 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate revenue | 25.920 | 26.885 | 13.616 | 27.702 |
| Operating profit | 11.712 | 12.393 | 6.292 | 12.805 |
| Net income | 8.223 | 8.563 | 4.345 | 8.787 |
| Operating cash | 9.447 | 10.551 | 5.222 | 11.347 |
| Cash capex | 2.775 | 3.365 | 1.516 | 3.586 |
| Free cash flow | 6.672 | 7.186 | 3.706 | 7.761 |
| Diluted EPS, USD | 11.39 | 11.95 | 6.10 | 12.31 |
Free cash flow here is the company’s definition: operating cash less cash capital expenditures. H1 2026 generated $5.222bn operating cash and spent $1.516bn capex, leaving $3.706bn. Dividends of $2.640bn plus cash treasury-share purchases of $1.251bn totalled $3.891bn, $185m more than that free cash flow. Borrowings, asset transactions, options and other cash movements reconcile the total; this six-month comparison does not establish that annual distributions are permanently uncovered. [S1]
H1 operating cash rose $796m year over year, but a $405m reduction in working-capital outflow explains part of that improvement. Net income increased $224m. It would be aggressive to compound the cash growth rate without examining timing. Free cash flow also excludes acquisitions and other investing activity: “available for shareholders” requires a further allocation decision. [S1]
TTM figures are FY25 plus H1 2026 less H1 2025; the periods overlap and must not be added together. TTM EPS uses the corresponding published rounded per-share periods, so the $12.31 sum is a valuation proxy rather than a fresh weighted-share calculation. At the dated price, trailing free-cash-flow yield is 4.5% and GAAP P/E is 19.7 times. [S1] [S2] [S6]
06. A dividend is cash; a buyback changes the denominator
June cash was $822m against $39.863bn debt, giving $39.041bn net debt. Operating lease liabilities were another $14.729bn. TTM operating profit covered interest about 7.9 times, but these obligations still require resilient operating cash and continuing refinancing access. The small cash balance makes cash-flow continuity and credit discipline more relevant than a simplistic net-cash test. Negative book equity reflects accumulated capital returns and is not, on its own, proof of economic insolvency. [S1] [S2]
On 17 September the board declared $1.93 per share payable on 15 December, a 4% increase and the equivalent of a $7.72 annual run rate. That is a 3.2% indicated yield at $242.67. The run rate is not the amount paid during calendar 2026. Future dividends are decisions, not contractual guarantees; our bear case deliberately tests a cut even though management highlights 50 consecutive years of annual increases. [S5] [S6]
The model begins with 707.642m June common shares and a 2.4m treasury-method dilutive-share proxy from H1. It issues new annual awards equivalent to 0.15% of opening common shares in base/bull and 0.20% in bear. Existing dilutive claims remain a constant proxy; a full award-by-award forecast is unavailable. Compensation remains an earnings expense and its noncash cash-flow addback is paired with dilution, not treated as free value. No option-exercise proceeds are credited. [S1]
After capex, cash rent support and a $300m annual allowance for other investments, dividends are funded before buybacks. Only the residual is repurchased, at an assumed 20 times pre-buyback earnings per share. Debt and cash remain at June levels; maturities are assumed refinanced, with no incremental borrowing to fund repurchases. Interest rises to $1.9bn in the base. Higher repurchase prices retire fewer shares, which is tested separately. No cash surplus is simultaneously counted as a buyback and terminal cash.
07. The base pays the reinvestment bill before retiring shares
| Independent base path | FY27 | FY28 | FY29 | FY30 | FY31 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate revenue, $bn | 27.50 | 26.80 | 28.00 | 29.50 | 31.00 |
| Operating margin | 48.5% | 50.5% | 52.0% | 53.5% | 54.0% |
| Net income, $bn | 8.999 | 9.133 | 9.914 | 10.848 | 11.575 |
| Cash capex, $bn | 3.45 | 3.45 | 3.45 | 3.40 | 3.40 |
| Free cash flow, $bn | 7.304 | 6.793 | 7.729 | 8.918 | 10.340 |
| Cash buybacks, $bn | 1.533 | 0.789 | 1.456 | 2.384 | 3.557 |
| Closing common shares, m | 702.65 | 700.65 | 696.53 | 689.88 | 680.27 |
| Average diluted EPS, USD | 12.72 | 12.97 | 14.14 | 15.59 | 16.84 |
The base relies on gradually better guest economics, new-unit contributions and refranchising, rather than a sudden step-change in consumption. FY31 revenue of $31bn at a 54% operating margin yields $16.74bn operating profit. Deduct $1.90bn interest and a simplified 22% tax rate: net income is $11.5752bn. Divide by 687.475m average diluted shares to obtain $16.8373 earnings per share. The model is GAAP-like and retains depreciation and compensation costs, but it is not a formal three-statement or statutory-tax forecast.
Free cash flow adds depreciation, noncash compensation and the annual rent-support charge to net income, then deducts actual rent-support cash, capex and a $400m annual working-capital/other operating-cash adjustment. The last allowance includes tax-timing normalisation rather than assuming the entire accounting tax charge is cash. Annual D&A is $2.2–2.4bn; base capital support totals $1.75bn through 2030 on top of $3bn annual baseline capex. FY31 includes $3.2bn baseline capex plus $200m support.
Across the base path, buybacks total $9.72bn and closing common shares fall to 680.27m. The earnings denominator is annual average diluted shares, not that lower closing count. Dividends are budgeted on opening shares plus new awards before buybacks, a conservative timing convention. The model’s first four quarterly investor receipts are $1.93 each; 5% annual increases begin with the assumed December 2027 payment. It does not move the next dividend increase forward by a year.
The operating periods FY2027–31 map to five stylised holding periods from 19 October 2026 to 19 October 2031. This simplification avoids implying quarterly precision that the sources do not support. It begins from June capital data without crediting unreported second-half share retirement. Refranchising proceeds, detailed currency effects, unusual charges, individual debt maturities and precise tax deductibility of support remain outside this model.
08. Three outcomes, including the dividends
| House case | FY31 revenue | Op margin | FY31 EPS | Exit P/E | Future price | 5Y dividends | Annual total return |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | $26.25bn | 47.0% | $11.48 | 15x | $172.20 | $32.42 | -3.4% |
| Base | $31.00bn | 54.0% | $16.84 | 20x | $336.75 | $42.66 | 9.3% |
| Bull | $34.75bn | 56.0% | $20.42 | 24x | $490.15 | $44.40 | 17.1% |
Bear five-year total-wealth CAGR: -3.4%. Base five-year total-wealth CAGR: 9.3%. Bull five-year total-wealth CAGR: 17.1%. No probabilities are assigned. Annual total-wealth CAGR = ((terminal share price + five years of cash dividends) / $242.67)^(1/5) − 1. Dividends are held as cash earning zero; they are not reinvested. Buybacks are embedded in the share count and must not be added again as investor distributions. Returns are nominal USD before investor tax, fees and currency effects.
The bear combines persistent value/traffic pressure, limited efficiency gains, support overruns, 47% terminal operating margin and a 15x exit P/E. It also assumes a 20% dividend cut beginning December 2027, then a flat rate, to preserve funding discipline. That cut is a stress assumption, not a forecast of a board decision. Even with it, buybacks are funded solely from remaining cash; the case does not conceal a debt plug or assume dividends are immune to weak economics.
The base terminal price is $16.8373 EPS × 20 = $336.75. Add $42.6579 of cash dividends over the holding period: terminal wealth is $379.40 per original share and annual total return is 9.3%. The bull requires $34.75bn revenue, a 56% operating margin, stronger earnings and 7% annual dividend increases from December 2027, plus a premium 24x exit P/E. Its 17.1% return still falls short of the 20% hurdle at the reference price.
A separate dated-dividend calculation gives base XIRR of 10.0%, versus the 9.3% cash-held wealth CAGR. It uses twenty quarterly receipts and terminal proceeds on 19 October 2031, recognising that dividends arrive before the final year. The December 2026 payment is declared; all later dates and amounts are assumptions. These are different return definitions, so the website ranking and conditional entry use only the cash-held wealth method.
09. A resilient company can still suffer a valuation reset
Base five-year total-wealth CAGR without rerating: 9.1%. The starting multiple is $242.67 divided by $12.31 trailing GAAP EPS, or 19.71x. Holding the base operating, cash and share path fixed and using that multiple at exit gives 9.1%, close to the 9.3% base at 20x. The central thesis therefore requires little multiple expansion. It still depends on earnings growth and continued willingness to pay about twenty times earnings.
| Single change to base | Annual total-wealth return | 20% hurdle ceiling |
|---|---|---|
| Keep the current 19.71x P/E | 9.1% | $150.53 |
| 16x terminal P/E | 5.2% | $125.41 |
| Operating margin −2 points each year | 8.3% | $145.62 |
| Cash rent + NEXT capital support +25% | 9.2% | $151.66 |
| Buybacks executed at 25x, not 20x | 9.2% | $151.38 |
| Annual new awards 0.50%, not 0.15% | 9.0% | $150.19 |
At a 16x exit P/E, base annual return falls to 5.2%. The operating-margin and support sensitivities rerun net income, cash availability and buybacks; they do not simply subtract an arbitrary dollar amount from the final price. For the support stress, the revenue/margin path already fixes the earnings outcome, so the additional amortisation is treated as a cash-bridge convention, not a separately forecast margin deterioration. In reality an overrun could also reduce profit and execution confidence.
Cash support has a modest isolated share-count effect in this model because the company can cut buybacks before dividends. That is not evidence that a failed NEXT programme is harmless. A combined failure would also hurt visits, profit, dividend policy and the valuation multiple. The bear is a combined operating and valuation stress; individual sensitivities are not substitute probabilities.
10. A lower price must still come with a sound business case
The base-case conditional entry for a 20% five-year total-wealth CAGR is $152.47 per share, calculated as $379.40 terminal wealth divided by 1.20^5. This holds operating assumptions, dividend policy, future repurchase execution prices, award dilution and cash treatment fixed. It is a hurdle ceiling, not a twelve-month target, verified fair value or automatic buying trigger. The corresponding 20% timed-dividend-IRR entry would be $162.69; that is a different metric and is not the website entry figure.
An independent equity cash-flow DCF produces a present-value cross-check of $183.61 per share at a 9% required return and 2.5% perpetual growth. Across 8–10% required returns and 2–3% growth, it spans $150.16–237.06. It discounts the same base cash after interest, capex, cash rent support and the $300m other-investment allowance, before dividends and buybacks. It removes the compensation addback as a cash-equivalent cost and uses the current diluted-share proxy, rather than forecasting repurchases again.
Because that cash is already after interest and rent, the DCF does not subtract debt or operating lease liabilities again. It assumes debt is refinanced at constant principal, adds no surplus cash and credits no sale proceeds. Perpetual cash growth requires continuing reinvestment; the terminal cash starts from the full FY31 capex and support burden. This simplified perpetuity is a cross-check, not a property appraisal or precise sum-of-parts value.
The reference price sits above the central DCF and near the optimistic end of its range. To earn 20% annually from $242.67 with base dividends, terminal wealth would need $603.84; at 20x this would require roughly $28.06 EPS, well above our $16.84 base. The investment decision should therefore focus on either much stronger verified cash economics or a substantially lower price, rather than assuming the brand automatically produces a high equity return.
11. What would change the view
| Driver | Evidence that earns confidence | Evidence that weakens it |
|---|---|---|
| Visits and value | US guest counts improve alongside profitable check/mix | Sales remain price-led while visits fall; discounts erode operator cash |
| NEXT execution | Installations, service times and realised operator cash substantiate productivity claims | Deployment delays, complexity or cost inflation absorb the gross benefit |
| Corporate cash | Cash support is transparent; conversion improves without unusual working-capital help | Reported margin rises while support cash or other investments grow faster |
| Refranchising | Profit dollars, rent collections and sensible disposal economics accompany a higher franchise mix | Margin percentage rises mainly because sales leave the denominator |
| Capital allocation | Dividends and buybacks fit after reinvestment with credit quality maintained | Borrowing masks distribution shortfalls or repurchases occur at unattractive prices |
| Valuation | Cash growth supports the implied earnings duration | A lower sustainable growth rate or higher required return compresses P/E |
The next quarterly results, 2027 cash-support guidance, franchisee deployment progress and refranchising disclosures are the practical catalysts. No unverified earnings date is asserted. Menu expansion and Make It Golden are initiatives to test, not outcomes to capitalise in advance. The main additional risks are food safety and brand trust, wage and commodity inflation, international currency/geopolitics, changes in consumer habits, data/technology execution and franchisee disputes. [S1] [S2] [S3] [S7]
The supplied research pack is used as a disagreement map. The October sector note informs cost and demand questions; the September JPMorgan note frames productivity and investment trade-offs; Deutsche Bank highlights the cash/earnings timing; Morgan Stanley details a possible support cadence and refranchising path. Their FY27 adjusted EPS estimates range from $12.90 to $13.78, versus our $12.72 GAAP-like model. Definitions differ, and these three observations are not a verified consensus. Their $260/$300/$297 targets use different horizons and methods and are not adopted as our valuation. [S8] [S9] [S10] [S11]
Source conflicts are resolved in favour of filed statements and primary slides: FY25 GAAP revenue is $26.885bn, not a broker model’s $26.573bn; corporate franchised-restaurant margins near 84% are not franchisee operating margins; the primary FY25 adjusted operating-margin baseline is 46.9%, not 47.5%. Price observations in the September notes are stale. Current financial actuals end June, not October. This edition rebuilds the earlier EPS-growth scenario into an explicit cash/share model and preserves the previous editions.
Evidence confidence is medium overall: historical cash, share and debt figures are strong; future guest response, rent-support accounting/cadence, realised franchisee returns and exit valuation remain uncertain. We have no full restaurant-cohort return study, exact post-June capital roll-forward or independently verified complete future debt schedule in this model. Conviction should rise when guest growth converts into cash after reinvestment, then into value per share.
Financial exhibits
Exact observations accompany every chart. Actuals, management guidance and Capital Thesis assumptions are labelled separately; the chart shapes do not imply probabilities.
Cash flow has grown, with a larger reinvestment bill
Capex absorbs a meaningful share of operating cash; TTM is a rolling period, not another independent year.
| Observation | Operating cash | Cash capex | Free cash flow |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2024 actual | 9.447 | 2.775 | 6.672 |
| FY2025 actual | 10.551 | 3.365 | 7.186 |
| TTM Jun26 | 11.347 | 3.586 | 7.761 |
TTM = FY25 + H1 2026 − H1 2025. FCF = operating cash less capex; excludes other investing activity. Sources: [S1] [S2]
H1 shareholder payments slightly exceeded cash after capex
This is a period-specific allocation comparison, not a forecast of permanent dividend underfunding.
| Observation | H1 2026 actual |
|---|---|
| Operating cash | 5.222 |
| Cash capex | 1.516 |
| Free cash flow | 3.706 |
| Dividends | 2.64 |
| Cash buybacks | 1.251 |
Capex, dividends and buybacks are displayed as positive outflow magnitudes; FCF subtracts capex. Dividends plus buybacks = $3.891bn. Sources: [S1]
The support cash can precede the earnings charge
Do not mistake a smaller annual accounting charge for a smaller funding need.
| Observation | Cash rent relief | Annual earnings amortisation | NEXT capital support |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2027 house | 0.25 | 0.025 | 0.45 |
| FY2028 house | 1 | 0.125 | 0.45 |
| FY2029 house | 1 | 0.225 | 0.45 |
| FY2030 house | 1 | 0.325 | 0.4 |
| FY2031 house | 0.4 | 0.365 | 0.2 |
Independent illustrative cadence and 10-year full-year amortisation convention; annual issuer cadence/accounting not verified. Capital support is inside capex, not an extra charge below FCF. Sources: [S3] [S4] [S10] [S11]
Buybacks flex while the base funds investment and dividends
Free cash flow softens in FY28 as support cash ramps, even though operating profit rises.
| Observation | Free cash flow | Cash buybacks |
|---|---|---|
| 2027 house | 7.3042 | 1.5331 |
| 2028 house | 6.793 | 0.7888 |
| 2029 house | 7.7288 | 1.4564 |
| 2030 house | 8.9179 | 2.3837 |
| 2031 house | 10.3402 | 3.5568 |
Capital Thesis forecasts; an additional $0.3bn annual other-investment allowance sits between FCF and distributions. Buybacks affect shares, not a second investor cash return. Sources: [S1] [S3] [S4]
Source register and research basis
Evidence checked for this edition on 20 October 2026. Dates below identify source vintages. Company guidance and house scenarios are conditional; source links and the downloadable model allow the assumptions to be inspected.
Year ended 31 December 2025; filed February 2026 · Primary: annual income/cash statements and franchise economics. TTM figures equal FY25 plus H1 2026 less H1 2025.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/63908/000006390826000035/mcd-20251231.htm23 September 2026 · Primary management strategy and targets, not achieved results. Corporate partnering support is a mix of rent relief and capital support; overlapping horizons must not be added.
https://corporate.mcdonalds.com/content/dam/sites/corp/nfl/pdf/2026%20Investor%20Day%20Press%20Release.pdf23 September 2026 · Primary, visually checked slides 7, 10–19: efficiency potential, support, payback, unit growth, capex, refranchising, G&A, adjusted margins and cash conversion. Several figures are images, absent from extracted text.
https://corporate.mcdonalds.com/content/dam/sites/corp/nfl/pdf/McD_InvestorDay_2026_Supporting%20Slides.pdf17 September 2026 · Primary: $1.93 quarterly dividend payable 15 December 2026 to holders of record 1 December. $7.72 is the annualised run rate, not FY26 cash paid.
https://corporate.mcdonalds.com/content/dam/sites/corp/nfl/pdf/MCD%20-%20Q4%2726%20Dividend%20Release.pdf19 October 2026 regular close; checked 20 October Sydney · Reference $242.67 at 4pm EDT, also observed at Yahoo/FT. ChartExchange showed $242.66 at 3:59:58; a one-cent timing/vendor difference. After-hours excluded.
https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/mcd/history/Accessed 20 October 2026 · Primary index: Q2/H1 latest verified actuals. Upcoming-quarter date not independently established, so no date is asserted.
https://corporate.mcdonalds.com/corpmcd/investors/financial-information.html1 October 2026; supplied input-1, pp.1–3 and sector tables · Secondary sector/commodity and demand context, not a McDonald’s realised cost basket or reported traffic series. Mostly broader restaurant-sector material. Publisher link is not a public copy of the supplied note.
https://www.morganstanley.com/24 September 2026; supplied input-2, pp.1–4 · Secondary interpretation and forecasts. FY27 adjusted EPS $12.90 and $260 December-2027 target are dated analyst estimates, not Capital Thesis outputs. Publisher link is not a public copy.
https://www.jpmorgan.com/24 September 2026; supplied input-3, pp.1–2 · Secondary: ten-year rent-support amortisation interpretation; FY27 adjusted EPS $13.78 and $300 target. Accounting cadence is not independently confirmed issuer guidance. Publisher link is not a public copy.
https://www.db.com/28 September 2026; supplied input-4, pp.1–3 · Secondary forecasts and explicitly assumed rent-relief cadence; $13.67 FY27 adjusted EPS and $297 target. Its 84% “franchisee margins” context is corporate franchised-restaurant margin, not operator profit. Publisher link is not a public copy.
https://www.morganstanley.com/