CAPITAL THESIS

Independent equity research · MCD · full edition

McDonald’sThe franchise is durable. NEXT has to earn back its cash.

A rent-and-royalty franchise with a substantial renewal bill. Guest growth, operator economics and cash-funded capital returns decide whether NEXT creates shareholder value.

Research date: 20 October 2026 · USD common equity · Reference price: USD 242.67 · Observation: 2026-10-19 regular close

Quality-franchise watchlist · valuation discipline

The investment decision

At $242.67, the independent base illustrates a 9.3% five-year annual total return with dividends held as cash. The conditional 20% hurdle is $152.47; the central equity cash-flow DCF is $183.61. Rising reported margins must be tested against the cash cost of NEXT.

Franchised restaurants95.6%44,016 of 46,028; June actual
H1 free cash flow$3.706bnOperating cash less cash capex
Base five-year total return9.3% p.a.Cash dividends held, not reinvested
Conditional 20% hurdle$152.47Fixed house path; not fair value

Edition update. Substantive research refresh using Q2/H1 filings, September Investor Day primary slides, four supplied analyst notes and the 19 October close. Rebuilds the prior EPS-growth scenario into an explicit cash-funded buyback/share model with correctly timed dividends. Earlier editions preserved.

01. The burger business supports a rent-and-royalty business

McDonald’s earns directly from its own restaurants and indirectly from a much larger franchise system. Conventional franchisees pay rent and royalties linked to sales, often with a minimum rent, while developmental licensees and affiliates generally pay royalties and initial fees. The latter usually fund their own property and restaurant capital. Treating every franchised restaurant as a company-owned property would overstate the real-estate exposure. Agreements typically last 20 years. [S1] [S2]

At June there were 46,028 system restaurants, including 44,016 franchised locations: 95.6% of the network. Only 2,012 were company operated. The corporate accounts therefore recognise only part of the system’s sales. A franchisee selling another meal pays food and labour costs first; McDonald’s receives its contractual share. This produces a high corporate margin, but it does not make franchisee economics irrelevant. Weak traffic, unaffordable remodels or poor restaurant cash returns eventually constrain rent collection, new openings and cooperation. [S1]

Scale supports purchasing terms, advertising reach, convenient sites, digital ordering and a familiar product. These advantages can help deliver affordable meals consistently. They do not eliminate competition from other quick-service formats, convenience stores or home consumption, nor do loyalty-member sales prove incremental demand. Property control and a deep operator network are durable assets; successful reinvestment is the mechanism that keeps them productive. [S1] [S2]

Our view is a quality-franchise watchlist, with valuation discipline. A five-year base returns 9.3% annually with cash dividends held, while a 20% hurdle needs roughly $152 under the same assumptions. The present-value cash cross-check is about $184. A strong brand and a long dividend record do not by themselves establish a bargain at $242.67.

02. The missing ingredient is sustained guest growth

Q2 global comparable sales rose 1.3%; the US increased 0.8%, International Operated Markets 1.5%, and International Developmental Licensed Markets 1.9%. US results reflected a higher average check, including mix, partly offset by negative comparable guest counts. That distinction matters: a higher ticket can protect sales temporarily while visit frequency deteriorates. Next-quarter evidence should separate traffic from pricing and mix rather than celebrate the total alone. [S1]

Value offers can recover visits, but discounts, staffing, ingredients and kitchen complexity determine whether those visits improve restaurant cash. Chicken and beverage expansion may add occasions and market share; preparation complexity can also slow service. Wage, food, occupancy and delivery costs largely hit franchisees before they appear in corporate margins. The supplied October sector note flags mixed commodity pressures, but its basket is not McDonald’s actual purchasing cost and its channel observations are not company-reported traffic. [S1] [S8]

Management’s NEXT strategy seeks 1.5 percentage points of share gains in each of chicken and beverages by 2030, alongside better hospitality and restaurant productivity. It estimates about 250 basis points of gross restaurant efficiencies, equivalent to roughly $100,000 annual gross cash benefit for an average US restaurant once deployed. A portion is to be reinvested; management expects the majority to benefit the restaurant bottom line over time. These are conditional targets, not realised savings or a guaranteed net profit increase. [S3] [S4]

03. NEXT requires cash before the productivity proof

Management target / planDefinition and timing
~$5bn corporate partnering2027–30; rent relief plus capital support
~$8.5bn partnering through 2036Includes the first $5bn; not an additional $8.5bn
~$3bn annual baseline capex2027–30, plus $1.5–2bn cumulative NEXT capital support
~4-year franchisee payback / ~5–6-year corporate paybackManagement estimates after partnering; contingent on deployment and results
Nearly 4.5% new unit growth in 2027Moderating to 3–3.5% in 2028–30; unit count is not sales growth
Non-comparable-sales contribution~2.5% in 2027, moderating to ~2% by 2030
~98% franchised mix by 2028A change in ownership and accounting mix, not equivalent organic growth

These targets are verified against the company’s presentation, including image-based slides. The implied 2027–30 rent-support component is roughly $3–3.5bn if the rest of the $5bn is the stated $1.5–2bn capital support. The precise annual mix is flexible. New locations in lower-volume markets can increase restaurant counts faster than system sales, which explains why the unit and sales contributions differ. [S3] [S4]

The cash-versus-earnings timing is central. Supplied analysts expect cash rent support to precede its full recognition in earnings over an approximately ten-year period. Our independent model uses a transparent illustrative schedule: $250m cash in 2027, $1bn annually in 2028–30, and $400m in 2031. At a full-year ten-year straight-line convention, the earnings charges are $25m, $125m, $225m, $325m and $365m. This is a house accounting approximation informed by the supplied notes, not confirmed issuer accounting guidance. [S10] [S11]

The model’s revenue and operating margin already include those annual earnings charges. To reach cash, it adds the noncash amortisation back once and subtracts the actual cash relief once. NEXT capital support appears in capex once. Adding the entire $5bn again below free cash flow would double count the commitment. In 2031 support continues in the model; it does not disappear merely because the first four-year target ends.

04. A shrinking revenue line can accompany better economics

When a company restaurant is sold to a franchisee, its full food sales leave corporate revenue. Rent and royalty receipts replace them, and most of its food and labour expense also leave the corporate income statement. Corporate revenue can therefore decline while the operating-margin percentage rises. The percentage has a smaller denominator; investors still need to inspect operating-profit dollars, sale proceeds, remaining property costs and cash reinvestment. [S1] [S4]

That is why our base corporate revenue falls from $27.5bn in FY27 to $26.8bn in FY28 while operating profit rises from $13.34bn to $13.53bn. Those are independent forecasts, not management’s revenue guidance. The model credits no disposal proceeds from refranchising, which is conservative but avoids inventing the sale price and timing. It also does not assume a dollar of higher margin is a dollar of incremental sales.

Management targets adjusted operating margins in the low-to-mid 50% range by 2030, G&A at 1.9% of system sales, and free-cash-flow conversion in the mid-to-high 80% range. Our base reaches a 53.5% model operating margin in 2030, but only 82.2% cash conversion because the cash support schedule is demanding; conversion reaches 89.3% in 2031. This visible shortfall is deliberate rather than quietly assuming every company target is met. The primary slide’s FY25 baseline is 46.1% GAAP and 46.9% adjusted operating margin. Supplied notes referring to 47.5% are not used as the filed baseline. [S3] [S4] [S9]

05. Reported profit converts to cash—but the claims compete

USD bn, except EPSFY2024 actualFY2025 actualH1 2026 actualTTM to June 2026
Corporate revenue25.92026.88513.61627.702
Operating profit11.71212.3936.29212.805
Net income8.2238.5634.3458.787
Operating cash9.44710.5515.22211.347
Cash capex2.7753.3651.5163.586
Free cash flow6.6727.1863.7067.761
Diluted EPS, USD11.3911.956.1012.31

Free cash flow here is the company’s definition: operating cash less cash capital expenditures. H1 2026 generated $5.222bn operating cash and spent $1.516bn capex, leaving $3.706bn. Dividends of $2.640bn plus cash treasury-share purchases of $1.251bn totalled $3.891bn, $185m more than that free cash flow. Borrowings, asset transactions, options and other cash movements reconcile the total; this six-month comparison does not establish that annual distributions are permanently uncovered. [S1]

H1 operating cash rose $796m year over year, but a $405m reduction in working-capital outflow explains part of that improvement. Net income increased $224m. It would be aggressive to compound the cash growth rate without examining timing. Free cash flow also excludes acquisitions and other investing activity: “available for shareholders” requires a further allocation decision. [S1]

TTM figures are FY25 plus H1 2026 less H1 2025; the periods overlap and must not be added together. TTM EPS uses the corresponding published rounded per-share periods, so the $12.31 sum is a valuation proxy rather than a fresh weighted-share calculation. At the dated price, trailing free-cash-flow yield is 4.5% and GAAP P/E is 19.7 times. [S1] [S2] [S6]

06. A dividend is cash; a buyback changes the denominator

June cash was $822m against $39.863bn debt, giving $39.041bn net debt. Operating lease liabilities were another $14.729bn. TTM operating profit covered interest about 7.9 times, but these obligations still require resilient operating cash and continuing refinancing access. The small cash balance makes cash-flow continuity and credit discipline more relevant than a simplistic net-cash test. Negative book equity reflects accumulated capital returns and is not, on its own, proof of economic insolvency. [S1] [S2]

On 17 September the board declared $1.93 per share payable on 15 December, a 4% increase and the equivalent of a $7.72 annual run rate. That is a 3.2% indicated yield at $242.67. The run rate is not the amount paid during calendar 2026. Future dividends are decisions, not contractual guarantees; our bear case deliberately tests a cut even though management highlights 50 consecutive years of annual increases. [S5] [S6]

The model begins with 707.642m June common shares and a 2.4m treasury-method dilutive-share proxy from H1. It issues new annual awards equivalent to 0.15% of opening common shares in base/bull and 0.20% in bear. Existing dilutive claims remain a constant proxy; a full award-by-award forecast is unavailable. Compensation remains an earnings expense and its noncash cash-flow addback is paired with dilution, not treated as free value. No option-exercise proceeds are credited. [S1]

After capex, cash rent support and a $300m annual allowance for other investments, dividends are funded before buybacks. Only the residual is repurchased, at an assumed 20 times pre-buyback earnings per share. Debt and cash remain at June levels; maturities are assumed refinanced, with no incremental borrowing to fund repurchases. Interest rises to $1.9bn in the base. Higher repurchase prices retire fewer shares, which is tested separately. No cash surplus is simultaneously counted as a buyback and terminal cash.

07. The base pays the reinvestment bill before retiring shares

Independent base pathFY27FY28FY29FY30FY31
Corporate revenue, $bn27.5026.8028.0029.5031.00
Operating margin48.5%50.5%52.0%53.5%54.0%
Net income, $bn8.9999.1339.91410.84811.575
Cash capex, $bn3.453.453.453.403.40
Free cash flow, $bn7.3046.7937.7298.91810.340
Cash buybacks, $bn1.5330.7891.4562.3843.557
Closing common shares, m702.65700.65696.53689.88680.27
Average diluted EPS, USD12.7212.9714.1415.5916.84

The base relies on gradually better guest economics, new-unit contributions and refranchising, rather than a sudden step-change in consumption. FY31 revenue of $31bn at a 54% operating margin yields $16.74bn operating profit. Deduct $1.90bn interest and a simplified 22% tax rate: net income is $11.5752bn. Divide by 687.475m average diluted shares to obtain $16.8373 earnings per share. The model is GAAP-like and retains depreciation and compensation costs, but it is not a formal three-statement or statutory-tax forecast.

Free cash flow adds depreciation, noncash compensation and the annual rent-support charge to net income, then deducts actual rent-support cash, capex and a $400m annual working-capital/other operating-cash adjustment. The last allowance includes tax-timing normalisation rather than assuming the entire accounting tax charge is cash. Annual D&A is $2.2–2.4bn; base capital support totals $1.75bn through 2030 on top of $3bn annual baseline capex. FY31 includes $3.2bn baseline capex plus $200m support.

Across the base path, buybacks total $9.72bn and closing common shares fall to 680.27m. The earnings denominator is annual average diluted shares, not that lower closing count. Dividends are budgeted on opening shares plus new awards before buybacks, a conservative timing convention. The model’s first four quarterly investor receipts are $1.93 each; 5% annual increases begin with the assumed December 2027 payment. It does not move the next dividend increase forward by a year.

The operating periods FY2027–31 map to five stylised holding periods from 19 October 2026 to 19 October 2031. This simplification avoids implying quarterly precision that the sources do not support. It begins from June capital data without crediting unreported second-half share retirement. Refranchising proceeds, detailed currency effects, unusual charges, individual debt maturities and precise tax deductibility of support remain outside this model.

08. Three outcomes, including the dividends

House caseFY31 revenueOp marginFY31 EPSExit P/EFuture price5Y dividendsAnnual total return
Bear$26.25bn47.0%$11.4815x$172.20$32.42-3.4%
Base$31.00bn54.0%$16.8420x$336.75$42.669.3%
Bull$34.75bn56.0%$20.4224x$490.15$44.4017.1%

Bear five-year total-wealth CAGR: -3.4%. Base five-year total-wealth CAGR: 9.3%. Bull five-year total-wealth CAGR: 17.1%. No probabilities are assigned. Annual total-wealth CAGR = ((terminal share price + five years of cash dividends) / $242.67)^(1/5) − 1. Dividends are held as cash earning zero; they are not reinvested. Buybacks are embedded in the share count and must not be added again as investor distributions. Returns are nominal USD before investor tax, fees and currency effects.

The bear combines persistent value/traffic pressure, limited efficiency gains, support overruns, 47% terminal operating margin and a 15x exit P/E. It also assumes a 20% dividend cut beginning December 2027, then a flat rate, to preserve funding discipline. That cut is a stress assumption, not a forecast of a board decision. Even with it, buybacks are funded solely from remaining cash; the case does not conceal a debt plug or assume dividends are immune to weak economics.

The base terminal price is $16.8373 EPS × 20 = $336.75. Add $42.6579 of cash dividends over the holding period: terminal wealth is $379.40 per original share and annual total return is 9.3%. The bull requires $34.75bn revenue, a 56% operating margin, stronger earnings and 7% annual dividend increases from December 2027, plus a premium 24x exit P/E. Its 17.1% return still falls short of the 20% hurdle at the reference price.

A separate dated-dividend calculation gives base XIRR of 10.0%, versus the 9.3% cash-held wealth CAGR. It uses twenty quarterly receipts and terminal proceeds on 19 October 2031, recognising that dividends arrive before the final year. The December 2026 payment is declared; all later dates and amounts are assumptions. These are different return definitions, so the website ranking and conditional entry use only the cash-held wealth method.

09. A resilient company can still suffer a valuation reset

Base five-year total-wealth CAGR without rerating: 9.1%. The starting multiple is $242.67 divided by $12.31 trailing GAAP EPS, or 19.71x. Holding the base operating, cash and share path fixed and using that multiple at exit gives 9.1%, close to the 9.3% base at 20x. The central thesis therefore requires little multiple expansion. It still depends on earnings growth and continued willingness to pay about twenty times earnings.

Single change to baseAnnual total-wealth return20% hurdle ceiling
Keep the current 19.71x P/E9.1%$150.53
16x terminal P/E5.2%$125.41
Operating margin −2 points each year8.3%$145.62
Cash rent + NEXT capital support +25%9.2%$151.66
Buybacks executed at 25x, not 20x9.2%$151.38
Annual new awards 0.50%, not 0.15%9.0%$150.19

At a 16x exit P/E, base annual return falls to 5.2%. The operating-margin and support sensitivities rerun net income, cash availability and buybacks; they do not simply subtract an arbitrary dollar amount from the final price. For the support stress, the revenue/margin path already fixes the earnings outcome, so the additional amortisation is treated as a cash-bridge convention, not a separately forecast margin deterioration. In reality an overrun could also reduce profit and execution confidence.

Cash support has a modest isolated share-count effect in this model because the company can cut buybacks before dividends. That is not evidence that a failed NEXT programme is harmless. A combined failure would also hurt visits, profit, dividend policy and the valuation multiple. The bear is a combined operating and valuation stress; individual sensitivities are not substitute probabilities.

10. A lower price must still come with a sound business case

The base-case conditional entry for a 20% five-year total-wealth CAGR is $152.47 per share, calculated as $379.40 terminal wealth divided by 1.20^5. This holds operating assumptions, dividend policy, future repurchase execution prices, award dilution and cash treatment fixed. It is a hurdle ceiling, not a twelve-month target, verified fair value or automatic buying trigger. The corresponding 20% timed-dividend-IRR entry would be $162.69; that is a different metric and is not the website entry figure.

An independent equity cash-flow DCF produces a present-value cross-check of $183.61 per share at a 9% required return and 2.5% perpetual growth. Across 8–10% required returns and 2–3% growth, it spans $150.16–237.06. It discounts the same base cash after interest, capex, cash rent support and the $300m other-investment allowance, before dividends and buybacks. It removes the compensation addback as a cash-equivalent cost and uses the current diluted-share proxy, rather than forecasting repurchases again.

Because that cash is already after interest and rent, the DCF does not subtract debt or operating lease liabilities again. It assumes debt is refinanced at constant principal, adds no surplus cash and credits no sale proceeds. Perpetual cash growth requires continuing reinvestment; the terminal cash starts from the full FY31 capex and support burden. This simplified perpetuity is a cross-check, not a property appraisal or precise sum-of-parts value.

The reference price sits above the central DCF and near the optimistic end of its range. To earn 20% annually from $242.67 with base dividends, terminal wealth would need $603.84; at 20x this would require roughly $28.06 EPS, well above our $16.84 base. The investment decision should therefore focus on either much stronger verified cash economics or a substantially lower price, rather than assuming the brand automatically produces a high equity return.

11. What would change the view

DriverEvidence that earns confidenceEvidence that weakens it
Visits and valueUS guest counts improve alongside profitable check/mixSales remain price-led while visits fall; discounts erode operator cash
NEXT executionInstallations, service times and realised operator cash substantiate productivity claimsDeployment delays, complexity or cost inflation absorb the gross benefit
Corporate cashCash support is transparent; conversion improves without unusual working-capital helpReported margin rises while support cash or other investments grow faster
RefranchisingProfit dollars, rent collections and sensible disposal economics accompany a higher franchise mixMargin percentage rises mainly because sales leave the denominator
Capital allocationDividends and buybacks fit after reinvestment with credit quality maintainedBorrowing masks distribution shortfalls or repurchases occur at unattractive prices
ValuationCash growth supports the implied earnings durationA lower sustainable growth rate or higher required return compresses P/E

The next quarterly results, 2027 cash-support guidance, franchisee deployment progress and refranchising disclosures are the practical catalysts. No unverified earnings date is asserted. Menu expansion and Make It Golden are initiatives to test, not outcomes to capitalise in advance. The main additional risks are food safety and brand trust, wage and commodity inflation, international currency/geopolitics, changes in consumer habits, data/technology execution and franchisee disputes. [S1] [S2] [S3] [S7]

The supplied research pack is used as a disagreement map. The October sector note informs cost and demand questions; the September JPMorgan note frames productivity and investment trade-offs; Deutsche Bank highlights the cash/earnings timing; Morgan Stanley details a possible support cadence and refranchising path. Their FY27 adjusted EPS estimates range from $12.90 to $13.78, versus our $12.72 GAAP-like model. Definitions differ, and these three observations are not a verified consensus. Their $260/$300/$297 targets use different horizons and methods and are not adopted as our valuation. [S8] [S9] [S10] [S11]

Source conflicts are resolved in favour of filed statements and primary slides: FY25 GAAP revenue is $26.885bn, not a broker model’s $26.573bn; corporate franchised-restaurant margins near 84% are not franchisee operating margins; the primary FY25 adjusted operating-margin baseline is 46.9%, not 47.5%. Price observations in the September notes are stale. Current financial actuals end June, not October. This edition rebuilds the earlier EPS-growth scenario into an explicit cash/share model and preserves the previous editions.

Evidence confidence is medium overall: historical cash, share and debt figures are strong; future guest response, rent-support accounting/cadence, realised franchisee returns and exit valuation remain uncertain. We have no full restaurant-cohort return study, exact post-June capital roll-forward or independently verified complete future debt schedule in this model. Conviction should rise when guest growth converts into cash after reinvestment, then into value per share.

Financial exhibits

Exact observations accompany every chart. Actuals, management guidance and Capital Thesis assumptions are labelled separately; the chart shapes do not imply probabilities.

Chart 01 · USD bn

Cash flow has grown, with a larger reinvestment bill

Capex absorbs a meaningful share of operating cash; TTM is a rolling period, not another independent year.

Operating cashCash capexFree cash flow
Cash flow has grown, with a larger reinvestment bill (USD bn). Exact figures in the table below.02.557.51012.5FY2024 actualOperating cash: 9.447 USD bn9.447Cash capex: 2.775 USD bn2.775Free cash flow: 6.672 USD bn6.672FY2025 actualOperating cash: 10.551 USD bn10.551Cash capex: 3.365 USD bn3.365Free cash flow: 7.186 USD bn7.186TTM Jun26Operating cash: 11.347 USD bn11.347Cash capex: 3.586 USD bn3.586Free cash flow: 7.761 USD bn7.761
Exact values · USD bn
ObservationOperating cashCash capexFree cash flow
FY2024 actual9.4472.7756.672
FY2025 actual10.5513.3657.186
TTM Jun2611.3473.5867.761

TTM = FY25 + H1 2026 − H1 2025. FCF = operating cash less capex; excludes other investing activity. Sources: [S1] [S2]

Chart 02 · USD bn

H1 shareholder payments slightly exceeded cash after capex

This is a period-specific allocation comparison, not a forecast of permanent dividend underfunding.

H1 2026 actual
H1 shareholder payments slightly exceeded cash after capex (USD bn). Exact figures in the table below.0123456Operating cashH1 2026 actual: 5.222 USD bn5.222Cash capexH1 2026 actual: 1.516 USD bn1.516Free cash flowH1 2026 actual: 3.706 USD bn3.706DividendsH1 2026 actual: 2.64 USD bn2.64Cash buybacksH1 2026 actual: 1.251 USD bn1.251
Exact values · USD bn
ObservationH1 2026 actual
Operating cash5.222
Cash capex1.516
Free cash flow3.706
Dividends2.64
Cash buybacks1.251

Capex, dividends and buybacks are displayed as positive outflow magnitudes; FCF subtracts capex. Dividends plus buybacks = $3.891bn. Sources: [S1]

Chart 03 · USD bn

The support cash can precede the earnings charge

Do not mistake a smaller annual accounting charge for a smaller funding need.

Cash rent reliefAnnual earnings amortisationNEXT capital support
The support cash can precede the earnings charge (USD bn). Exact figures in the table below.00.250.50.751FY2027 houseCash rent relief: 0.25 USD bn0.25Annual earnings amortisation: 0.025 USD bn0.025NEXT capital support: 0.45 USD bn0.45FY2028 houseCash rent relief: 1 USD bn1Annual earnings amortisation: 0.125 USD bn0.125NEXT capital support: 0.45 USD bn0.45FY2029 houseCash rent relief: 1 USD bn1Annual earnings amortisation: 0.225 USD bn0.225NEXT capital support: 0.45 USD bn0.45FY2030 houseCash rent relief: 1 USD bn1Annual earnings amortisation: 0.325 USD bn0.325NEXT capital support: 0.4 USD bn0.4FY2031 houseCash rent relief: 0.4 USD bn0.4Annual earnings amortisation: 0.365 USD bn0.365NEXT capital support: 0.2 USD bn0.2
Exact values · USD bn
ObservationCash rent reliefAnnual earnings amortisationNEXT capital support
FY2027 house0.250.0250.45
FY2028 house10.1250.45
FY2029 house10.2250.45
FY2030 house10.3250.4
FY2031 house0.40.3650.2

Independent illustrative cadence and 10-year full-year amortisation convention; annual issuer cadence/accounting not verified. Capital support is inside capex, not an extra charge below FCF. Sources: [S3] [S4] [S10] [S11]

Chart 04 · USD bn

Buybacks flex while the base funds investment and dividends

Free cash flow softens in FY28 as support cash ramps, even though operating profit rises.

Free cash flowCash buybacks
Buybacks flex while the base funds investment and dividends (USD bn). Exact figures in the table below.02.557.51012.52027 houseFree cash flow: 7.3042 USD bn7.3042Cash buybacks: 1.5331 USD bn1.53312028 houseFree cash flow: 6.793 USD bn6.793Cash buybacks: 0.7888 USD bn0.78882029 houseFree cash flow: 7.7288 USD bn7.7288Cash buybacks: 1.4564 USD bn1.45642030 houseFree cash flow: 8.9179 USD bn8.9179Cash buybacks: 2.3837 USD bn2.38372031 houseFree cash flow: 10.3402 USD bn10.3402Cash buybacks: 3.5568 USD bn3.5568
Exact values · USD bn
ObservationFree cash flowCash buybacks
2027 house7.30421.5331
2028 house6.7930.7888
2029 house7.72881.4564
2030 house8.91792.3837
2031 house10.34023.5568

Capital Thesis forecasts; an additional $0.3bn annual other-investment allowance sits between FCF and distributions. Buybacks affect shares, not a second investor cash return. Sources: [S1] [S3] [S4]

Source register and research basis

Evidence checked for this edition on 20 October 2026. Dates below identify source vintages. Company guidance and house scenarios are conditional; source links and the downloadable model allow the assumptions to be inspected.

S6 · MCD historical market prices

19 October 2026 regular close; checked 20 October Sydney · Reference $242.67 at 4pm EDT, also observed at Yahoo/FT. ChartExchange showed $242.66 at 3:59:58; a one-cent timing/vendor difference. After-hours excluded.

https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/mcd/history/
S8 · Morgan Stanley — The Monthly Dish: October 2026

1 October 2026; supplied input-1, pp.1–3 and sector tables · Secondary sector/commodity and demand context, not a McDonald’s realised cost basket or reported traffic series. Mostly broader restaurant-sector material. Publisher link is not a public copy of the supplied note.

https://www.morganstanley.com/
S9 · JPMorgan — McDonald’s Investor Day review

24 September 2026; supplied input-2, pp.1–4 · Secondary interpretation and forecasts. FY27 adjusted EPS $12.90 and $260 December-2027 target are dated analyst estimates, not Capital Thesis outputs. Publisher link is not a public copy.

https://www.jpmorgan.com/
S10 · Deutsche Bank — Takeaways from MCD Investor Day

24 September 2026; supplied input-3, pp.1–2 · Secondary: ten-year rent-support amortisation interpretation; FY27 adjusted EPS $13.78 and $300 target. Accounting cadence is not independently confirmed issuer guidance. Publisher link is not a public copy.

https://www.db.com/
S11 · Morgan Stanley — Model Update Post Investor Day

28 September 2026; supplied input-4, pp.1–3 · Secondary forecasts and explicitly assumed rent-relief cadence; $13.67 FY27 adjusted EPS and $297 target. Its 84% “franchisee margins” context is corporate franchised-restaurant margin, not operator profit. Publisher link is not a public copy.

https://www.morganstanley.com/