CAPITAL THESIS

Independent equity research · MCD · full edition

McDonald’sThe dividend is visible. The renewal return is still to be earned.

A durable royalty-and-rent franchise with a sizeable renewal bill. The five-year base case is about 10% annually; a 20% hurdle needs much stronger earnings or a materially lower entry.

Research date: 15 October 2026 · USD common equity · Reference price: USD 238.31 · Observation: 2026-10-14

Watchlist / evidence-led underwriting

The investment decision

At $238.31, the base case produces 10.4% five-year total-wealth CAGR and 9.7% without rerating. The decisive variable is cash left after franchisee support, reinvestment and distributions, not a headline corporate margin target.

Reference price$238.3114 October 2026 regular close; S5
TTM GAAP EPS$12.31FY2025 + H1 2026 − H1 2025; S1/S2
TTM FCF$7.761bnOperating cash less all capex; S1/S2
Base wealth CAGR10.4%Capital Thesis five-year model; distributions held as cash

Edition update. Primary filings and the September NEXT framework reviewed 15 October 2026; no subsequent quarterly results identified. Actuals remain through June 2026. September operating assumptions are retained and exposed, while the entry price and starting multiple are reset to the 14 October regular close. This is an updated evidence review and five-year sensitivity, not a new integrated fiscal forecast.

01. A strong system still needs healthy operators

The investment question is whether McDonald’s can turn a repair of value, service and restaurant productivity into cash that reaches owners. Brand recognition and convenient locations support a durable business. They do not eliminate the cost of staying relevant. Our base case allows moderate earnings growth and recurring dividends, but does not grant a 20% return merely because the company has a long record of distributions.

Conventional franchisees operate the restaurants while McDonald’s receives rent and royalties; developmental licensees assume more local capital responsibility. Property control protects the network and influences operator behaviour. Adding a separate real-estate value to earnings already generated by those properties would double-count their economic contribution. At June-end, 44,016 of 46,028 restaurants were franchised, or 95.6%. Corporate profitability should therefore never be confused with the profitability of an individual franchisee. [S1][S2]

The strongest constructive case is that affordability restores visit frequency while better operations improve service and throughput. The opposing case is that savings are passed to customers or absorbed by wages and food costs, leaving franchisees dependent on continued concessions. Specialists in chicken, coffee and beverages can win an occasion without replicating the whole McDonald’s system. Grocery, convenience and eating at home also compete for the customer’s budget. These are the competitive mechanisms we monitor; no unverified market-share or peer-multiple premium is assumed.

For investors, the useful operating sequence is visits, restaurant cash economics, system reinvestment and then corporate per-share cash. Loyalty engagement and a higher average check can support that sequence, but neither establishes incremental profit on its own.

02. The financial record and the limits of headline growth

USD bn except EPSFY2024FY2025H1 2025H1 2026
Revenue25.92026.88512.79913.616
Operating income11.71212.3935.8806.292
Net income8.2238.5634.1214.345
Diluted GAAP EPS$11.39$11.95$5.74$6.10
Operating cash flow9.44710.5514.4265.222
Cash capex2.7753.3651.2951.516
Calculated FCF6.6727.1863.1313.706

Reported statement values; FCF is our subtraction of all cash capex from operating cash. Half-years are not annualised. The TTM bridge is FY2025 plus H1 2026 less H1 2025: revenue $27.702bn, EBIT $12.805bn, net income $8.787bn and FCF $7.761bn. The $12.31 TTM EPS figure is a bridge of reported period EPS, rather than net income divided by a same-day share count. [S1][S2]

Q2 global comparable sales grew 1.3%; the US grew 0.8%, International Operated Markets 1.5% and licensed markets 1.9%. Systemwide sales reached about $37bn. TTM loyalty-member system sales were about $40bn, with nearly 220m active users across 70 markets. These are system measures, not consolidated corporate revenue. The margin between a promotional visit and a profitable repeat visit remains an underwriting question. [S6]

No new quarterly result is embedded simply because this report carries an October date. The price is newer than the financial statements. We deliberately retain this distinction so a change in valuation cannot be mistaken for fresh evidence of traffic recovery. [S8]

03. Cash available to shareholders

The trailing free-cash-flow yield is 4.60%. FCF converts about 88.3% of net income, but it is not all available for repurchases. The declared dividend run-rate of $7.72 per share implies a $5.463bn annual budget on June common shares, around 70% of trailing FCF. Only $2.298bn remains before buybacks, acquisitions and other balance-sheet demands. A dividend can be well supported while the room for aggressive repurchases is limited. [S1][S2][S4]

Cash testUSD bn / result
TTM operating cash flow11.347
Less all cash capex(3.586)
TTM FCF7.761
Forward dividend budget on June shares(5.463)
Residual before other capital uses2.298
H1 dividends + buybacks3.891
H1 FCF3.706

The first-half distribution outflow exceeded FCF by $185m. Seasonality and timing matter, so this does not prove a permanently unfunded dividend. It does mean that historical capital returns should not be projected automatically. Trailing stock compensation of approximately $175m is already an expense in GAAP earnings; subtracting it from FCF produces a separate dilution-cost sensitivity, not a second deduction inside our EPS scenario.

We use all reported capex rather than inventing a maintenance-only number. Adding back growth capex while preserving the growth it buys would artificially improve owner earnings. Working capital can also help or hurt a single period’s CFO. The research monitor is sustained cash conversion after the investment programme, not the highest isolated cash quarter.

04. NEXT, leverage and the financing constraint

The September NEXT plan explicitly couples productivity ambitions with franchisee support. Management targets a low-to-mid-50% corporate operating margin by 2030 and mid-to-high-80% FCF/net-income conversion. It anticipates roughly $3bn annual baseline capex in 2027–2030 plus $1.5–2bn cumulative capital partnering support. The broader support package is about $5bn through 2030 and $8.5bn through 2036, combining rent relief and capital. These overlapping commitments must not be added as separate spending programmes. [S3]

Gross restaurant efficiency goals are not equivalent to corporate earnings. Some benefits may fund affordability, inflation and service. The base model’s 86% conversion assumption is consistent with the eventual management framework, but its timing remains an assumption. Realised restaurant-cohort returns and a verified maintenance/growth capex split are unavailable; a targeted payback period is not an observed return.

June 2026 capital bridgeUSD bn
Borrowings39.863
Cash0.822
Net borrowings39.041
Operating lease liabilities14.729
Equity value at October price / June shares168.638
EV excluding leases207.679

Leases are kept separate. A lease-inclusive EV comparison would require a consistent rent-adjusted denominator. Net borrowings are roughly five times trailing FCF; EBIT covers the approximately $1.625bn TTM interest expense 7.9 times. An eventual 200bp increase across the whole debt balance would cost about $0.80bn pre-tax, but that is a stress rather than an immediate reset because debt reprices over time. Negative book equity also makes ordinary P/B and ROE poor valuation anchors here. [S1][S2]

05. Five-year valuation: separate growth from rerating

The model begins with $12.31 GAAP TTM EPS. Terminal EPS equals that amount multiplied by five years of scenario growth. Terminal wealth equals terminal EPS times the chosen exit P/E plus cumulative dividends. Total-wealth CAGR is (wealth ÷ $238.31)^(1/5) − 1. It is not an IRR; distributions earn zero while held as cash. No scenario probabilities are estimated. [S7]

House assumption / outputBearBaseBull
EPS annual growth−2%7%10%
Exit P/E15×20×24×
First model-year DPS$7.00$8.106$8.2604
Dividend annual growth0%5%7%
Terminal EPS$11.13$17.27$19.83
Terminal price$166.91$345.31$475.81
Cumulative dividends$35.00$44.79$47.50
Terminal wealth$201.91$390.10$523.31

Bear five-year total-wealth CAGR: -3.3%.

Base five-year total-wealth CAGR: 10.4%.

Bull five-year total-wealth CAGR: 17.0%.

Base five-year total-wealth CAGR without rerating: 9.7%.

The bear combines shrinking earnings with a dividend cut and a lower multiple. The base requires demand stabilisation and useful productivity gains. The bull demands both faster operating progress and a 24× exit multiple; it is explicitly a rerating case. None is a maximum-loss boundary. The no-rerating comparison uses the new entry multiple, $238.31 ÷ $12.31 = 19.3591×, and the same base dividends. Its benchmark therefore differs slightly from the September report’s entry multiple.

These operating assumptions are retained because no newer financial release establishes a different sustainable EPS path and the September NEXT framework was already incorporated. That is a reason to keep a transparent conditional model, not evidence that every assumption has become more likely.

06. Can the base case fund its share retirement?

With net shares declining 0.75% annually, 7% EPS growth needs about 6.20% annual net-income growth. A plausible operating bridge is roughly 4% revenue growth with the operating margin rising from 46.2% toward 51.3% over five years, assuming broadly stable below-operating economics. This is a plausibility check, not additional growth added to the EPS model.

Model yearEPSDPSFCF / opening shareGross buybacks / opening shareResidual
1$13.17$8.11$11.24$2.37$0.77
2$14.09$8.51$12.03$2.54$0.98
3$15.08$8.94$12.87$2.71$1.22
4$16.14$9.38$13.77$2.90$1.48
5$17.27$9.85$14.74$3.11$1.78

FCF is 86% of net income. Gross repurchases are 0.90% of opening shares and award dilution is 0.15%, leaving 0.75% net retirement. Repurchases cost 20 times that year’s EPS. FCF per opening share therefore equals EPS × 86% × 99.25%; buyback cost equals EPS × 20 × 0.90%. Charging a full dividend against every opening share is conservative. Issuance proceeds are ignored.

The first-year buffer is only about $0.77 per opening share. Conversion below roughly 80.1% would not fund the same dividend and repurchase policy under these assumptions. Buybacks should then slow before the model receives unchanged per-share growth credit. Additional support costs, acquisitions or debt retirement also compete for that residual. A funding cross-check makes the model auditable; it does not prove a future treasury policy.

07. What a 20% hurdle would actually require

The base-case conditional entry for a 20% five-year total-wealth CAGR is $156.77 per share, calculated as $390.10 terminal wealth divided by 1.20^5. This holds the operating forecast, cash dividends, future repurchase prices, net share path and cash treatment fixed; a different actual entry price does not automatically re-underwrite those assumptions. This is not a current fair-value target.

At $238.31, the hurdle requires $592.99 terminal wealth. With base dividends held fixed, the model needs an exit multiple of 31.8× on base EPS. That is substantially above both the current multiple and the 20× base exit assumption. It would be poor underwriting to raise the multiple merely to make a target return appear.

Exit P/ERequired terminal EPSRequired EPS CAGR
16×$34.2622.7%
20×$27.4117.4%
24×$22.8413.2%
28×$19.589.7%

The backsolve is useful because it reveals the burden of proof. It is not a buy order at the calculated price. A fall caused by damaged franchise economics or a larger support bill requires a new forecast. Nor should PEG be elevated over the cash model: a P/E divided by an assumed growth rate hides distributions, reinvestment, leverage and terminal-multiple risk.

This edition does not repeat stale broker target averages as though they were current. Twelve-month targets, five-year terminal values and present-value estimates answer different questions. None of the report’s terminal share values is a near-term target.

08. Catalysts, falsifiers and evidence boundaries

MonitorStrengthening evidenceReason to re-underwrite
Demand / quarterly resultsGuest-count recovery with credible value and marginsSales rely on price/mix while transactions deteriorate
NEXT / annual updatesMeasured operator cash returns and deployment within budgetSupport expands without better service or returns
Cash / rolling four quartersConversion funds dividends and modest repurchasesPersistent sub-80% conversion or debt-funded returns
Unit economics / through 2028Openings meet credible cash-return testsDelays or expansion without cohort economics
Earnings qualityNet income supplies most of EPS growthAdjustments and debt replace operating progress

The next quarterly release, implementation evidence from NEXT and the declared December dividend are practical checkpoints. We do not assign incremental EPS to promotional launches or an unverified earnings date. Current institutional positioning, borrow rates, options flows and short-interest signals were not independently verified; they contribute no numerical value to this model.

The strongest adverse path is simultaneous pressure on visits, franchisee economics and the market multiple. Food safety, labour costs, cyber disruption and currency can compound that outcome. A profitable, famous franchise can still deliver a disappointing equity return. Intermediate drawdowns can be much greater than the five-year bear outcome.

Actual statements end June 2026; price observation is 14 October; research review is 15 October. All returns are nominal USD before tax, fees and currency translation. The forecast is a conditional EPS/dividend model with an explicit funding sensitivity, not a fully integrated debt-maturity or tax model. Audited statement arithmetic controls over inconsistent prose or vendor labels. Primary evidence is stronger than confidence in five-year outcomes. General investment research, not personalised financial advice.

Financial exhibits

Exact observations accompany every chart. Actuals, management guidance and Capital Thesis assumptions are labelled separately; the chart shapes do not imply probabilities.

Chart 01 · USD bn

More cash generation, but a rising reinvestment bill

Operating cash has improved; capex absorbs a larger portion, so the distributable cash yield is more modest than the earnings margin.

Operating cash flowCash capexCalculated FCF
More cash generation, but a rising reinvestment bill (USD bn). Exact figures in the table below.02.557.51012.5FY2024Operating cash flow: 9.447 USD bn9.447Cash capex: 2.775 USD bn2.775Calculated FCF: 6.672 USD bn6.672FY2025Operating cash flow: 10.551 USD bn10.551Cash capex: 3.365 USD bn3.365Calculated FCF: 7.186 USD bn7.186TTM Jun 2026Operating cash flow: 11.347 USD bn11.347Cash capex: 3.586 USD bn3.586Calculated FCF: 7.761 USD bn7.761
Exact values · USD bn
ObservationOperating cash flowCash capexCalculated FCF
FY20249.4472.7756.672
FY202510.5513.3657.186
TTM Jun 202611.3473.5867.761

Reported full-year cash flows; TTM = FY2025 + H1 2026 − H1 2025. TTM overlaps FY2025. FCF subtracts all cash capex. Sources: [S1] [S2]

Chart 02 · USD per opening share

The dividend leaves a modest buyback buffer

The base funding case is positive but sensitive to cash conversion and the price paid for repurchases.

FCF proxyCash dividendGross repurchase cost
The dividend leaves a modest buyback buffer (USD per opening share). Exact figures in the table below.02.557.51012.515Year 1EFCF proxy: 11.2427 USD per opening share11.2427Cash dividend: 8.106 USD per opening share8.106Gross repurchase cost: 2.3709 USD per opening share2.3709Year 2EFCF proxy: 12.0297 USD per opening share12.0297Cash dividend: 8.5113 USD per opening share8.5113Gross repurchase cost: 2.5369 USD per opening share2.5369Year 3EFCF proxy: 12.8718 USD per opening share12.8718Cash dividend: 8.9369 USD per opening share8.9369Gross repurchase cost: 2.7145 USD per opening share2.7145Year 4EFCF proxy: 13.7728 USD per opening share13.7728Cash dividend: 9.3837 USD per opening share9.3837Gross repurchase cost: 2.9045 USD per opening share2.9045Year 5EFCF proxy: 14.7369 USD per opening share14.7369Cash dividend: 9.8529 USD per opening share9.8529Gross repurchase cost: 3.1078 USD per opening share3.1078
Exact values · USD per opening share
ObservationFCF proxyCash dividendGross repurchase cost
Year 1E11.24278.1062.3709
Year 2E12.02978.51132.5369
Year 3E12.87188.93692.7145
Year 4E13.77289.38372.9045
Year 5E14.73699.85293.1078

Capital Thesis retained assumptions reviewed 15 October. 86% cash conversion; 0.90% gross repurchases less 0.15% dilution; 20× repurchase P/E. Annual holding-period intervals, not fiscal-year guidance. Sources: [S7]

Source register and research basis

Evidence checked for this edition on 15 October 2026. Dates below identify source vintages. Company guidance and house scenarios are conditional; source links and the downloadable model allow the assumptions to be inspected.